Current Issue - VOLUME 22
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Ending the Death Penalty for People With Severe Mental Illness (How Recent Supreme Court Cases Interpreting Atkins v. Virginia Support a New Death Penalty Prohibition)
Josh Salzer | Vol. 22 | Online
This article argues that courts or legislatures should prohibit the execution of people with severe mental illness who were significantly impaired by their illness at the time of their crime in light of recent Supreme Court death penalty interpretation of Atkins. Defendants who were significantly impaired by severe mental illness at the time of their crime should not be eligible for the death penalty because they have sufficiently reduced culpability. This reduced culpability, as for defendants with intellectual disability in Atkins and juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, cannot be adequately accounted for in sentencing. A new prohibition should therefore be created and operate as a dispositive mitigating factor against imposing the death penalty.
Josh Salzer | Vol. 22 | Online
This article argues that courts or legislatures should prohibit the execution of people with severe mental illness who were significantly impaired by their illness at the time of their crime in light of recent Supreme Court death penalty interpretation of Atkins. Defendants who were significantly impaired by severe mental illness at the time of their crime should not be eligible for the death penalty because they have sufficiently reduced culpability. This reduced culpability, as for defendants with intellectual disability in Atkins and juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, cannot be adequately accounted for in sentencing. A new prohibition should therefore be created and operate as a dispositive mitigating factor against imposing the death penalty.
Blurred Lines: An Analysis of Whether Prosecutorial Discretion Extends to Lessening a Sentence Ex-Post in Light of the Separation of Powers Doctrine
Mikaela Meyer | Vol. 22 | Online
As the trend of expanding prosecutorial powers continues, it is important to consider: What are the bounds of this power? This comment analyzes the recent conduct of Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner, in the case Commonwealth v. Brown, where he attempted to alter a defendant's imposed sentence ex post, and argued that this was within the realm of prosecutorial discretion. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this argument, and other prosecutors have made similar arguments to little avail. This comment considers the original intent behind prosecutorial discretion, the trend in expanding this power, and what arguments could be made to allow prosecutors the ability to alter imposed sentences.
Mikaela Meyer | Vol. 22 | Online
As the trend of expanding prosecutorial powers continues, it is important to consider: What are the bounds of this power? This comment analyzes the recent conduct of Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner, in the case Commonwealth v. Brown, where he attempted to alter a defendant's imposed sentence ex post, and argued that this was within the realm of prosecutorial discretion. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this argument, and other prosecutors have made similar arguments to little avail. This comment considers the original intent behind prosecutorial discretion, the trend in expanding this power, and what arguments could be made to allow prosecutors the ability to alter imposed sentences.
Race-Conscious Admissions, Diversity, and Academic Freedom
Vinay Harpalani | Vol. 22 | Online
This Essay examines the First Amendment component to race-conscious admissions policies. It argues that these policies reflect a core First Amendment value: academic freedom. It illustrates that race-conscious admissions policies promote academic freedom in two ways. One aspect of a university’s academic freedom is the selection of its own student body. Justice Felix Frankfurter stated this explicitly in his concurrence in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), which was later cited in Justice Lewis Powell's influential concurrence in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978). Additionally, the compelling interest in diversity has roots in the First Amendment. By facilitating the admission of a more diverse student body, race-conscious admissions policies contribute to the “marketplace of ideas” on campus - thus embodying the values inhering from freedom of speech. The Essay also examines how the marketplace rationale is more availing in the context of student diversity than it is in the production of scholarship.
Vinay Harpalani | Vol. 22 | Online
This Essay examines the First Amendment component to race-conscious admissions policies. It argues that these policies reflect a core First Amendment value: academic freedom. It illustrates that race-conscious admissions policies promote academic freedom in two ways. One aspect of a university’s academic freedom is the selection of its own student body. Justice Felix Frankfurter stated this explicitly in his concurrence in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957), which was later cited in Justice Lewis Powell's influential concurrence in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978). Additionally, the compelling interest in diversity has roots in the First Amendment. By facilitating the admission of a more diverse student body, race-conscious admissions policies contribute to the “marketplace of ideas” on campus - thus embodying the values inhering from freedom of speech. The Essay also examines how the marketplace rationale is more availing in the context of student diversity than it is in the production of scholarship.
Ministerial Magic: Tax-Free Housing and Religious Employers
Bridget J. Crawford & Emily Gold Waldman | Vol. 22 | Online
Religious organizations enjoy many of the same benefits that other non-profit organizations do. Churches, temples and mosques, for example, generally are exempt from local real estate taxes. Economically speaking, a tax exemption has the same effect as a subsidy; freedom from tax liability means that the organization can devote its financial resources to other activities. But where an exemption afforded to a religious employee is broader than the equivalent exemption available to a secular employee, a significant Establishment Clause concern is raised. The parsonage exemption of Internal Revenue Code Section 107 presents such an issue: ministers are permitted to exclude cash housing allowances from their taxable income as a matter of course, even though the equivalent exemptions for secular employees are far more limited. Recently, however, in Gaylor v. Mnuchin, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that the parsonage exemption violates the Establishment Clause. This Essay evaluates the court’s reasoning and suggests that the decision minimized the extent to which the parsonage exemption provides active governmental support for religion. This minimization, we argue, led to a distorted Establishment Clause analysis and the wrong result. We also address an issue lurking in the background: the intersection between the parsonage exemption and sex discrimination, given that some religions do not permit women to serve in religious leadership roles that would qualify them as ministers under Section 107. Although the stronger constitutional argument against the parsonage exemption stems from the Establishment Clause, both issues raise important policy concerns.
Bridget J. Crawford & Emily Gold Waldman | Vol. 22 | Online
Religious organizations enjoy many of the same benefits that other non-profit organizations do. Churches, temples and mosques, for example, generally are exempt from local real estate taxes. Economically speaking, a tax exemption has the same effect as a subsidy; freedom from tax liability means that the organization can devote its financial resources to other activities. But where an exemption afforded to a religious employee is broader than the equivalent exemption available to a secular employee, a significant Establishment Clause concern is raised. The parsonage exemption of Internal Revenue Code Section 107 presents such an issue: ministers are permitted to exclude cash housing allowances from their taxable income as a matter of course, even though the equivalent exemptions for secular employees are far more limited. Recently, however, in Gaylor v. Mnuchin, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that the parsonage exemption violates the Establishment Clause. This Essay evaluates the court’s reasoning and suggests that the decision minimized the extent to which the parsonage exemption provides active governmental support for religion. This minimization, we argue, led to a distorted Establishment Clause analysis and the wrong result. We also address an issue lurking in the background: the intersection between the parsonage exemption and sex discrimination, given that some religions do not permit women to serve in religious leadership roles that would qualify them as ministers under Section 107. Although the stronger constitutional argument against the parsonage exemption stems from the Establishment Clause, both issues raise important policy concerns.
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